The attempted arrest of the MP for Manhyia South, Nana Agyei Baffour Awuah, at the Accra High Court today, 23rd September, 2026, has revived an old but important constitutional question: when, how and in what circumstances may a Member of Parliament be arrested?

I have a particular interest in this question.

In 2021, I issued a writ at the Supreme Court for two lawyers, Hilda Mansuwa Kpentey Dongotey and Albert Gyamfi, challenging aspects of the parliamentary arrangement then governing the service of process and arrest of an MP. That constitutional action remains pending.

The present controversy requires us to separate four questions which are easily confused:

Does an MP have immunity from arrest? Must the Speaker first give permission before an MP can be arrested? Can an MP be arrested without a warrant? And even where there is a lawful power of arrest, was that power lawfully exercised in this particular case?

They are not the same questions.

WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION ACTUALLY SAY?

The starting point is Article 117 of the 1992 Constitution:

“Civil or criminal process coming from any court or place out of Parliament shall not be served on, or executed in relation to, the Speaker or a member or the Clerk to Parliament while he is on his way to, attending at or returning from, any proceedings of Parliament.”

Notice what the Constitution does not say.

It does not say that an MP cannot be arrested. It does not grant an MP immunity throughout the entire duration of a parliamentary meeting or session. It does not prevent an MP from being investigated. And it does not expressly say that the permission of the Speaker must first be obtained before the criminal law can operate against an MP.

The purpose of Article 117 is readily understandable: Parliament must be protected against interference with its proceedings. But protecting Parliament is one thing; converting membership of Parliament into personal immunity from the ordinary criminal law is another.

There is also Article 17. It declares that all persons are equal before the law and prohibits discrimination on grounds including social or economic status. Its definition of discrimination also addresses differential treatment by which privileges or advantages are granted to one class of persons but not another.

That does not cancel Article 117. Parliamentary privilege is itself constitutionally guaranteed. But Article 17 cautions against enlarging that limited protection, by practice or protocol, into a general immunity the Constitution did not grant.

The balance is simple: protect Parliament from interference, but do not protect parliamentarians from the ordinary law beyond what the Constitution actually provides.

THE QUESTION WE TOOK TO THE SUPREME COURT

This controversy did not begin with the Manhyia South MP.

It came dramatically into public view in 2021 when my friend, the Madina MP, Dr. Francis-Xavier Sosu, was sought by the Police following incidents associated with a demonstration he led in his constituency. He invoked parliamentary privilege, as other MPs have done before and since. Police attempted to arrest him in church. The NDC collectively resisted and decried it.  

I have always asked a fairly simple question.

Suppose an MP is genuinely driving to Parliament and, on the way, hits and kills somebody in circumstances amounting to an offence. Must a police officer who witnesses it allow him to continue because he says, “I am on my way to Parliament”?

Take an even clearer example. Suppose an MP is proceeding to Parliament carrying contraband and is caught red-handed. Or he assaults somebody while proceeding to parliamentary business.

Can Article 117 really mean that a police officer who catches the MP in flagrante delicto must say:

“You are an MP on your way to Parliament. I cannot arrest you until the Speaker permits me”?

That question goes to the heart of the pending constitutional action.

Among other reliefs, the plaintiffs ask the Supreme Court to determine whether, upon a true interpretation of Articles 117 and 118, an authorised officer or process server requires the leave or certificate of the Speaker to serve or execute civil or criminal process against an MP who is about his personal affairs or ordinarily engaged in activities in his constituency.

We also ask whether the constitutional expressions “attendance” and “proceedings of Parliament” can properly be stretched to encompass the entire duration of a parliamentary session or meeting.

The practical arrangement which existed under Speaker Professor Aaron Mike Oquaye treated the Speaker as having an important gatekeeping role before an MP could be arrested. The constitutional question is whether parliamentary practice can enlarge an immunity beyond what the Constitution itself grants.

That question remains before the Supreme Court.

SPEAKER BAGBIN HAS SINCE DRAWN AN IMPORTANT LINE

There has, however, been a significant development.

On 21st May, 2026, Speaker Alban Sumana Kingsford Bagbin rejected the proposition that security agencies require his permission before arresting or inviting an MP. His position was that the agency should notify the Speaker and provide the circumstances so that any applicable parliamentary privilege or immunity may be determined.

That distinction is crucial:

NOTIFICATION IS NOT PERMISSION.

The Speaker does not issue a licence for the criminal law to operate. Equally, an arrest cannot be used to defeat a privilege which the Constitution actually confers.

AN ARREST DOES NOT ALWAYS REQUIRE A WARRANT

There is another misconception exposed by this controversy: not every lawful arrest requires a warrant.

Section 10 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) permits arrest without warrant in specified circumstances. These include where an offence is committed in the presence of a police officer and where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence.

And EOCO has police powers. Section 18 of the Economic and Organised Crime Office Act, 2010 (Act 804) clothes the Executive Director, Deputy Executive Directors and officers authorised by the Executive Director with the powers and immunities conferred on police officers under Act 30 and other applicable law.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor is similarly clothed with police powers under section 28 of Act 959.

So the mere response, “Show me the warrant,” does not determine whether an arrest is lawful.

But the absence of a requirement for a warrant does not create an unlimited power of arrest. There must still be lawful authority and lawful grounds for that particular arrest.

And that brings us to Manhyia South.

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED BETWEEN EOCO AND BAFFOUR AWUAH?

EOCO says its officers attempted to arrest Baffour Awuah in connection with an ongoing investigation. It says he had twice been invited in February to assist with the investigation, did not honour those invitations, and that the attempted arrest was one of the lawful steps subsequently taken to secure his attendance.

We now have the correspondence.

EOCO's first letter of 10th February, 2026, headed “Invitation Pursuant to Sec. 19 of Act 804/10,” was addressed to the Senior Partner of Sarkodie Baffour Awuah & Partners. It stated that EOCO was investigating alleged financial irregularities at SIC Life Savings & Loans Company Limited and considered the firm's input important to the investigation.

But I have seen a second letter, and it materially clarifies the picture.

On 27th February, 2026, EOCO wrote expressly to:

“Nana Agyei Baffour Awuah
Senior Partner
Sarkodie Baffour Awuah And Partners.”

EOCO acknowledged that Baffour Awuah had informed it that, having become an MP, the earlier invitation had been referred to the Clerk of Parliament for advice. EOCO rejected the suggestion that this prevented his attendance and stated that it was unaware of any law or established protocol preventing him from honouring the invitation.

It then warned that failure to honour the invitation might leave EOCO with no choice but to “compel him to appear before the Office.”

So one point should be conceded immediately.

It would not be accurate to say that EOCO never specifically required Baffour Awuah himself to attend. It did.

The letter is interesting for another reason. EOCO was itself disputing, as far back as February, the proposition that the mere fact that Baffour Awuah had become an MP required its investigative invitation to be channelled through Parliament.

But that does not settle the legality of what happened seven months later.

It sharpens the real question.

WHEN DOES “COME AND ASSIST US” BECOME “YOU ARE UNDER ARREST”?

Both February letters were expressly issued pursuant to section 19 of Act 804.

They sought Baffour Awuah's assistance with an investigation. The second warned that EOCO might “compel him to appear.”

But three things must not automatically be treated as synonymous:

INVITATION, COMPULSION TO ATTEND, ARREST.

An administrative letter cannot itself create a power to deprive a person of his liberty. That power must ultimately be found in law.

The critical question is therefore:

What provision of Act 804 or Act 30 authorised EOCO, seven months later, to convert Baffour Awuah's failure personally to honour the section 19 invitation into a warrantless arrest?

There is another relevant fact. Material supplied by the MP indicates that Theresa Tabi, Managing Partner of Sarkodie Baffour Awuah & Partners, subsequently engaged EOCO, attending on 4^th March, 18^th March, and 30^th April, 2026, and ultimately providing a written statement.

The competing positions can therefore be stated fairly.

EOCO can say that Baffour Awuah himself did not personally honour its invitations. He can say that his law firm nevertheless subsequently cooperated with the investigation and supplied the information requested.

Neither fact, standing alone, answers whether the attempted arrest seven months later was lawful.

WHAT OFFENCE WAS HE BEING ARRESTED FOR?

This, for me, is now the critical question.

If EOCO relies upon section 10 of Act 30 because its officers had reasonable grounds to suspect Baffour Awuah of having committed an offence, then:

What offence? What were the reasonable grounds? And when did that suspicion arise?

The February correspondence, on its face, did not accuse Baffour Awuah of committing the alleged financial irregularities at SIC Life Savings & Loans. It sought his assistance with an investigation.

EOCO's statement issued today similarly describes the attempted arrest as a step taken to secure his attendance after the invitations were not honoured.

There may be additional facts which EOCO has not publicly disclosed. Those could materially alter the legal analysis.

But on the presently available material, an important question remains:

What was the precise statutory basis for the arrest?

That is far more important than simply asking whether EOCO possessed a warrant.

THEN THERE IS THE MANNER OF THE ARREST

There is another issue entirely separate from parliamentary privilege.

Baffour Awuah says, as we see in the video, the woman in plain clothes approached him at the High Court claiming to be an EOCO officer; that she failed, when challenged, to produce satisfactory identification or proof of authority; and that although he offered to drive himself to EOCO, she insisted that he enter their vehicle.

EOCO subsequently confirmed that its officers were indeed attempting to arrest him.

That establishes their identity after the event. It does not completely answer the problem confronting a citizen at the moment persons in plain clothes attempt to take physical custody of him and place him in a vehicle.

Law enforcement must be capable of being distinguished from abduction.

That does not give anybody licence to violently resist a lawful arrest merely because the officer is not in uniform or because no warrant is produced. It means something more elementary: where plain-clothes officers seek to deprive a person of liberty, their identity and lawful authority matter.

And in EOCO's particular case, section 18 of Act 804 makes the question of authority relevant: was the person purporting to exercise police powers an officer authorised to do so under the Act?

PARLIAMENT IS NOT A SANCTUARY

EOCO says Baffour Awuah subsequently proceeded to Parliament to seek “sanctuary”, although Parliament was on recess.

The parliamentary precincts are not a constitutional sanctuary from the criminal law. An MP cannot manufacture Article 117 immunity simply by driving into Parliament after law-enforcement officers approach him elsewhere.

But saying “Parliament is on recess” does not necessarily conclude the Article 117 inquiry either.

The Constitution speaks of a Member who is “on his way to, attending at or returning from, any proceedings of Parliament.” If there was an actual parliamentary proceeding, including qualifying committee business, and an MP was genuinely proceeding to it, that presents a question to be resolved on the facts and the proper interpretation of Article 117.

MY VERDICT

The principle should not be complicated.

Article 17 demands equality before the law and guards against discriminatory privilege. Article 117 protects the work of Parliament. Neither should be stretched to destroy the other.

An MP caught committing an offence cannot automatically convert “I am going to Parliament” into immunity from the criminal law.

Equally, there is a legitimate institutional concern about the other side of the equation. Warrantless arrest is an enormous power. If abused or deliberately timed to remove an MP when his presence is critical to parliamentary proceedings or a vote, a legitimate law-enforcement power could become an instrument for securing political advantage.

That is one concern on which the rival NDC and NPP MPs may readily find common cause, if only from the instinct of self-preservation. Governments change. Parliamentary majorities change. Those wielding State power today may sit on the opposite side tomorrow. The power used against an opponent today may be the power used against them tomorrow.

The Constitution must therefore guard against both abuses: MPs stretching a limited parliamentary privilege into personal immunity, and the State stretching lawful powers of arrest into a means of interfering with Parliament.

As for the immediate controversy, the 27^th February letter strengthens EOCO's position that Baffour Awuah himself was required to attend and did not personally honour that invitation. But it does not by itself establish the legality of the attempted arrest seven months later.

The missing legal bridge remains important:

What transformed the section 19 invitation to assist an investigation into lawful authority for his arrest?

If EOCO was arresting him on reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence, identify the offence and the grounds. If the purpose was simply to compel attendance because he had not honoured the invitation, identify the statutory power authorising arrest for that purpose.

And the broader constitutional question remains the one my clients placed before the Supreme Court:

How far does Article 117 protect the functioning of Parliament without becoming personal immunity from the ordinary criminal law?

The Court's eventual answer should provide much-needed clarity.

The Constitution must protect Parliament without creating impunity for parliamentarians; and enforce the criminal law without giving the State a weapon for manipulating Parliament.

No Member of Parliament is above the law. And no law-enforcement agency is above the law governing its power of arrest.

That is THE LAW 101.

Join me on my weekly legal clinic, THE LAW, on the JoyNews Channel every Sunday @ 2:00 p.m., with a repeat broadcast on Monday at 11:00 a.m. THE LAW is your legal light and your help law.