Ghana is experiencing economic turbulence on a level not seen since the 1980s. Its currency, the cedi, is the worst performing in the world and Ghana’s debt-to-GDP ratio has risen to over 80 per cent.

Consumer prices rose over 40 per cent in October. Food prices in Ghana are now the highest in Africa, and there is a real risk of worsening food shortages in coming months.

Much of the international news coverage surrounding Ghana’s economic crisis has rightly focused on the impacts on Ghanaian businesses and consumers, responses from international investors and the government’s contentious relationship with the International Monetary Fund. Our analysis points out another important dimension of the crisis: changes in Ghana’s politics.

Since June, frustrated Ghanaians have protested the government’s management of the economy. They demand that President Nana Akufo-Addo dismiss Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Ken Ofori-Atta. On social media, critics are using the #KenMustGo hashtag to question Ofori-Atta’s handling of the economic crisis — and accuse him of benefiting personally from Ghana’s debt.

The president’s refusal to dismiss Ofori-Atta prompted an unusual response from Ghana’s parliament: a motion to censure the minister. If the motion passes, it would mark the first time that Ghana’s legislative branch has exercised its constitutional power to remove a minister. While the presidency remains very powerful in Ghanaian politics, we see this as a new chapter in which the parliament will have more leverage to hold the president and the cabinet to account.

Why the president won’t dismiss the finance minister

One of the more puzzling aspects of this controversy is why the president refuses to remove Ofori-Atta. Last month, for instance, British Prime Minister Liz Truss tried to save her government after a series of disastrous economic moves by firing her finance minister. In Ghana, the situation seems to leave the president at risk of the embarrassment of being overpowered by members of parliament (MPs) from both the opposition and his own party.

Our research in Ghana suggests two political reasons the president hasn’t fired his finance minister — a move that might help deflect the criticism of Ghana’s poor economic performance.

First, as Rachel Sigman demonstrates in her forthcoming book “Parties, Political Finance, and Governance in Africa,” ministerial appointments are tied to how African leaders finance their political operations. In Ghana, presidents often select loyal party elite to serve in minister positions, where they can steer contracts and other government business to party-aligned businesses in exchange for financial support to the party.

For Akufo-Addo, dismissing Ofori-Atta would probably jeopardize his ability to raise funds for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in advance of the 2024 presidential elections. Having long served as the party’s chief financier, Ofori-Atta has deep experience fundraising for the NPP. Akufo-Addo would struggle to find a minister with the requisite technical, political and financial acumen to fill the role.

The difficulty of finding a replacement minister is further complicated by the presence of sharp divisions within the NPP — the subject of George M. Bob-Milliar’s research. The NPP is dominated by two factions: one that is aligned with Akufo-Addo and the other with former president John Kufuor.

Ghana’s term limits mean Akufo-Addo will step down in January 2025 — and the competition between the two factions to determine the next NPP presidential candidate will be fierce. There are rumors that the Kufuor faction is exploiting the #KenMustGo controversy to its advantage. Those aligned with Akufo-Addo, meanwhile, would look for a replacement finance minister that supports his faction’s efforts to maintain power within the party, further limiting the pool of potential appointees.

Will Ghana strengthen legislative oversight?

The president’s refusal to dismiss Ofori-Atta has led to a rare instance in which parliament may use its constitutional authority to remove a minister from office. Legislative oversight of the executive is weak in Ghana, even when compared with less-democratic African countries. Ghana’s presidents have been known to use their appointment powers to shore up their support in parliament, helping them to evade accountability for government actions.

The current events surrounding Ofori-Atta signal a change to this pattern. The censure motion appears to have support from both major parties. At least 98 MPs from the president’s party have indicated their support for Ofori-Atta’s removal. These MPs planned to boycott Ofori-Atta’s presentation of the 2023 budget until a last-minute intervention by party elders appealed to the MPs to attend the presentation. Nevertheless, MPs have sent a strong signal to the president.

The NPP members’ public support for Ofori-Atta’s removal is significant. The MPs appear frustrated that their constituents are suffering. By prioritizing constituent concerns over party loyalty, MPs in Ghana are pushing parliament — and, ultimately, Ghana’s democracy — in a more responsive and accountable direction.

Parliamentary moves to remove Ofori-Atta are bolstered by the unprecedented partisan composition. Since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Ghana in 1992, the current eighth parliament is the only one in which the president’s party does not enjoy an absolute majority. The hung parliament presents both opportunities and challenges for Ghana’s legislature.

No matter what happens with the vote to remove Ofori-Atta, these events in Ghana hold implications both within and beyond its borders. Other leaders in Africa face divided legislatures that threaten the primacy of executive power. Perhaps one silver lining of the looming economic turbulence that’s not unique to Ghana is that economic pressures could push legislatures to assert their independence — and strengthen democratic institutions.

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George M. Bob-Milliar is an associate professor in the Department of History and Political Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana. His research interests lie in the area of electoral politics, and Ghana’s social and political history.

Rachel Sigman is an assistant professor of democratic governance in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. She is the author of Parties Political Finance and Governance in Africa (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).