Since the eruption of violent extremism in the Western Sahel with the 2012 Malian Insurrection, just a handful of countries have remained unscathed to date. While there has been southward diffusion of violent extremist attacks on littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea, Ghana has been spared of any attacks.

But why has Ghana been free of any such attacks when neighbouring Ivory Coast, Togo, and Benin have all received varying degrees of attacks? Well, answering this shouldn’t go beyond the following three responses as highlighted by security analysts:

(1) The security apparatus of Ghana is on top of the impending terrorist threats from neighbouring countries, as such they are taking proactive action to curb terrorism; (2) The absence of terrorist attacks on Ghanaian soil is due to sheer luck and lack of terrorists’ interests in Ghana; (3) There is yet to be terrorist attacks in Ghana because insurgents are biding their time and studying the terrain and will strike at the ripe moment.

The first view - Ghana’s security is in control - is the farthest from the reality on the ground. Large swathes of ungoverned and governed and porous borders lend credence to the fact that there is nothing like Ghana’s security is in control. Under this ineffective monitoring, surveillance, and patrol systems how will Ghana's security forces track and prevent the entry and possible attacks by nonstate armed groups in neighbouring Burkina Faso? Several reports from eyewitnesses confirmed the presence of NSAGS in border communities in the Upper East and Upper West regions.

The problem is further compounded by the sickening border management by the appropriate security agencies. Several unapproved routes are used by foreign nationals for entry into Ghana for business and other illicit activities.

At the designated entry points of Ghana’s northern frontier, professionalism, rigorous scrutiny and adherence to entry protocol have given way to extortion and corrupt practices. Although the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols allow nationals of other member states to travel to Ghana, the magnitude of foreign immigrants flooding Ghana is alarming.

To put it bluntly, paying money to Ghana Immigration Officials at the borders is what a foreign national needs to enter Ghana. The fundamental question here is: How can Ghana’s security be in control of fending off terrorism when all you need to get into Ghana is to pay a small amount of money to Immigration Officers?

It bears acknowledgment of Ghana’s stepped-up security efforts to counter terrorism in its northern borders. But as it stands now, the reality on the ground suggests very little is being done to prevent the spread of terrorism into Ghana.

The second view - Ghana’s unscathed territory is tied to sheer luck and NSAGS' lack of interest in striking Ghana - is grounded in the fact that a peaceful Ghana aids the smooth operations of violent extremists in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Togo. Yes! The northern frontiers of Ghana provide several benefits for extremist fighters and hence roiling the security of the country deprives them of this conducive terrain.

Perhaps the following analysis will make this claim clearer. First, terrorist groups operating in the Liptako-Gourma region (BF, Niger, Mali) thrive on illicit activities (cattle rustling, Gold seizures at mining sites, and drug trafficking among others). Ghana, through borders in the Upper Regions, provides a key market for these ill-gotten goods. Relatedly, several crucial logistics needed by VEGs to survive and also push back the persistent hounding from state forces are obtained from Ghana.

Talk of foodstuff, fuel, and chemical fertilizers (mainly the government’s PFJ fertilizer smuggled by dealers). [Note: The Nitrate in chemical fertilizer is a highly explosive material used in the manufacture of IEDs]. From rational economic thinking, no businessperson will destabilize its biggest consumer base.

Logistically, yet again, the VEGs will be unwilling to break the smooth supply chain that provides them with vital logistics. Implicitly, an attack on Ghana is like to incur aggressive counterterrorism responses and increase border security, surveillance, and monitoring that could jeopardize the key benefits terrorist groups obtain under this status quo.

This perhaps explains why there is a general lack of interest in carrying out terrorist attacks in Ghana unlike in northern Togo and Northern Ivory Coast. A recent incident in a small town in the Boulougou province of BF, also located very close to Bawku add more weight to the “Luck and Lack of Interest” assertion.

As narrated from various credible sources, a kidnapping incident happened in late April 2023 where a Ghanaian from Bawku was among the victims. The young man in his early 30s was carting tubers of yam on his tricycle to Bittou when he was picked up by the insurgents. He recounts a painful and terrifying ordeal of how he and several other captives were hosted in a remote forest in the Bittou department. He indicated that about five captives were killed and dumped into a huge bottomless pit.

When it got to his turn, however, something unusual happened. The captors asked the abductees to show their national identity cards. This was where his “Ghana Card” made the difference. After proving his Ghanaian identity, his captors indicated they don’t have any problem with Ghanaians and allowed him to go, albeit with an empty tricycle.

But could this be a temporary position that could change when the dynamics change? What could trigger a change of interest in Ghana?

Finally, the third possible explanation for Ghana’s statelessness from insurgent attacks sounds quite speculative yet plausible. The argument here is: it appears NSAGS is keenly exploring and assessing Ghana’s sociopolitical and security terrain before launching its first strike on Ghana. As rational actors, terrorist organizations weigh the pros and cons before engaging in violence at an opportune time. While Ivory Coast, Togo, and Benin share sociocultural and political overlaps with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the spillover of violence into these coastal countries was far from overnight.

It took years of terrain maneuvering and sociopolitical studies before violent extremists could carry out attacks and also establish bases there. In Ghana’s case, ceteris paribus, things are likely to take much longer as extremists need more time to study, adjust and adapt to the sociopolitical and security dynamics of the country. Spillover attack incidents are, however, likely to catalyze much sooner when local violent extremists (affiliates) emerge as insurgents against the Ghanaian state.

But how do we as a country take measures to insulate our population from terrorism, mass violence, and its devastating consequences? There are a few suggestions here:

The first is, improving good governance. This includes, among other things, creating an enabling environment for the masses to earn a living through social, economic, and technical support. Evidence shows the violence in the Sahel region is driven predominantly by massive youth unemployment. It’s a violence of “No-Jobism” and not “Jihadism”.

The government yet again needs to walk wide of the traps fallen into by BF and others to prevent extremism or minimize its risks in Ghana. No state can be immune to violence and crime but how states manage these security incidents determines whether or not systematic violence could emerge. The Sahelian states have relied solely on a heavy-handed military approach to tackle violence. This approach has not only failed but created more terrorists and violent attacks than prevent them.

The state securities in those countries have relied on ethnic profiling and collective punishments of certain social groups perceived to be collaborating with extremists - an approach that has resulted in extrajudicial killings, widespread human rights violations, massive displacement, breakdown in social trust and cohesion, and overall spiralling insecurity.

The Ghana government and its security apparatus should take key lessons from this largely unsuccessful approach and employ a more systematic and people-centric approach to addressing security threats in the country.

Third and closely related to the aforementioned, the security apparatus of Ghana (police, military, immigration, customs, and prisons) need to collaborate more and coordinate collectively to protect the country from terrorism. It appears there’s an unhealthy inter-agency rivalry that could undermine efforts to address the growing insecurity in the country. The state and its appropriate institutions must develop a consistent national security policy to guide each agency to act in the best interest of the nation, and not each agency to itself.

Finally, improved civil-security (civil-military) relations are key to preventing terrorism. This has to do with working closely with civilians and also taking action on security tip-offs or intelligence from civilians. More importantly, also, the security forces should avoid brutality against innocent civilians (for example the 2023 Ashaiman military brutality) to protect their reputation and public confidence.

****

Authored by Eliasu Tanko, a journalist and Abdul Zanya Salifu, PhD Student and a researcher focusing on Climate Change and Security.